Ensuring fairness of machine learning systems is a human-in-theloop process. It relies on developers, users, and the general public to identify fairness problems and make improvements. To facilitate the process we need efective, unbiased, and user-friendly explanations that people can conidently rely on. Towards that end, we conducted an empirical study with four types of programmatically generated explanations to understand how they impact people's fairness judgments of ML systems. With an experiment involving more than 160 Mechanical Turk workers, we show that: 1) Certain explanations are considered inherently less fair, while others can enhance people's conidence in the fairness of the algorithm; 2) Diferent fairness problemsśsuch as model-wide fairness issues versus casespeciic fairness discrepanciesśmay be more efectively exposed through diferent styles of explanation; 3) Individual diferences, including prior positions and judgment criteria of algorithmic fairness, impact how people react to diferent styles of explanation. We conclude with a discussion on providing personalized and adaptive explanations to support fairness judgments of ML systems.
INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, important decisions that impact human lives and societal progress are supported by machine learning (ML) systems. Examples where ML systems are used to make decisions include hiring, marketing, medical diagnosis, and criminal justice. This Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for proit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the irst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speciic permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. IUI ' trend gives rise to concerns about algorithm fairnessÐor possible discriminatory consequences for certain groups of individuals. Machine learning algorithms are trained based on data from past decisions, decisions which may have themselves been biased and discriminatory. Research shows that by optimizing for the unitary goal of accuracy, ML algorithms trained on historical data not only replicate, but may amplify existing biases or discrimination [40] . The possibility of spiraling discriminatory consequences is driving a distrust and łfear of AIž in public discussions (e.g., [1, 2] ).
There is a growing body of work on developing non-discriminatory ML algorithms (e.g., [16, 17, 38] ), equal attention has not been paid to the human scrutiny necessary to identify and remedy fairness issues. The need for such research is highlighted by recent studies, which show that algorithmic fairness often may not be prescriptively deined, but is multi-dimensional and context-dependent [14] . Public scrutiny of the usage of risk assessment algorithms in the criminal justice system [3, 21] brings attention to the need to progress the accountability and fairness of such algorithms.
Accurately identifying fairness issues in ML systems is extremely challenging, however. Most ML algorithms aim to produce only prediction or decision outcomes, while humans tend to rely on information about decision-making processes to justify the decisions made. ML algorithms are often seen as łblack boxesž, where one can only see the output and make a best guess about the underlying mechanisms. This problem is further exacerbated by the popularity of deep learning algorithms, which are often unintelligible even for experts. This lack of transparency drives a sweeping call for explainable artiicial intelligence (XAI) in industry, academia, and public regulation. For example, the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requires organizations deploying ML systems to provide afected individuals with meaningful information about the logic behind their outputs.
Critically, explanations are not just for people to understand the ML system, they also provide a more efective interface for the human in-the-loop, enabling people to identify and address fairness and other issues. When people trust the explanation, it follows that they would be more likely to trust the underlying ML systems.
Much recent research is dedicated to the generation of explanations in various styles, including model-agnostic approaches [26, 30] applicable to any ML algorithm. However, this growing body of research is criticized for łapproaching this [XAI] challenge in a vacuum considering only the computational problemsž [27] without the quintessential understanding of how people perceive and use the explanations.
In this paper, we conduct an empirical study on how people make fairness judgments of ML systems and how explanation impacts that judgment. We aim to highlight the nuances of such judgments, where there are diferent types of fairness issues, diferent styles of explanation, and individual diferences, to encourage future research in this area to take more user-centric and personalized approaches.
Speciically, we identify four styles of explanation based on prior XAI work and automatically generate them for a ML model trained on a real-world data set. In the experiment, we explore the efectiveness of explanations in exposing two types of fairness issuesśmodelwide unfairness produced by biased data, and fairness discrepancies in cases from diferent regions of the feature space. Our user study demonstrates that judging fairness is not only inluenced by explanation design, but also an individual's prior position on algorithmic fairness, including both the general trust of ML systems for decision support and one's position on using a particular feature. We also present user feedback for the four styles of explanation. Our results provide insights on the mechanisms of people's fairness judgment of ML systems, and design guidelines for explanations to facilitate fairness judgment making. We irst review relevant work, then present the study overview and research questions.
BACKGROUND 2.1 Fairness of Machine Learning Systems
One of several deinitions for algorithmic fairness is: ł...discrimination is considered to be present if for two individuals that have the same characteristic relevant to the decision making and difer only in the sensitive attribute (e.g., gender/race) a model results in diferent decisionsž [8] . The consequence of deploying unfair ML systems could be disparate impact, practices which adversely afect people of one protected characteristic more than another in a comparable situation [8, 14] .
Despite the łstatistical rationalityž of ML techniques, it has been widely recognized that they can lead to discrimination. Many reasons can contribute to this, including biased sampling, incorrect labeling (especially with subjective labeling), biased representation (e.g., incomplete or correlated features), suboptimal or insensitive optimization algorithm, shift of population or data distribution, and failure to consider domain-speciic, legal, or ethical constraints [8, 15] . Various techniques have been proposed to address these causes of łunfair algorithmsž [15ś17, 38, 39] . For example Calders and Žliobaitė suggested techniques to de-bias data [8] , including modifying labels of the training data, duplicating or deleting instances, adding synthetic instances, and transforming data into a new representation space.
We use a recently proposed data de-biasing method that applies a preprocessor to transform the data [9] . The result is a new dataset which is łfaireržśwhile also limiting local deformations from the data transformation. This is because the preprocessor optimizes data transformations with respect to penalties that rise with the magnitude of a feature change (e.g. changing a persons age from 5 to 60 will result in a higher penalty than from 5 to 8). Simply put, if raw data contains biases that lead to an unfair model with a discriminatory feature (e.g., certain racial category is weighed more negatively than others), the data preprocessing mitigates the bias introduced by that feature. This method has the beneit of retaining all features (as opposed to removing the discriminatory feature), which, among other beneits, would also allow exploration of correlations among them [8] .
The above debiasing techniques are normative by nature, i.e., they rely on prescriptively deining the criteria of fairness in order to optimize for that criteria. A recent paper pursued a complementary descriptive approach by empirically studying how people judge the fairness of features used by a decision support system in the criminal justice system [14] . Their study uncovered the underlying dimensions in people's reasoning of algorithmic fairness, and demonstrated individuals' variations on these dimensions.
We adopt the same descriptive view, empirically studying how people judge fairness of an ML system and considering individual diferences in their prior position on algorithmic fairness. However, we also ill a gap in prior work by investigating how normative fairness (via the use of the preprocessor) is perceived by people, and what factors impact such perception.
Explanation of Machine Learning
Explainable AI (XAI) is a ield broadly concerned with making AI systems more transparent so people can conidently trust an AI system and accurately troubleshoot it Ð fairness issues included. Work on model explanations can be traced to early work on expert systems [11, 33] , which often explicitly revealed reasoning rules to end-users. There has been a recent resurgence of XAI work driven by the challenge to interpret increasingly complex ML models, such as multi-layered neural networks, and by the evidence that ethical concerns and lack of trust hampers adoption of AI applications [15, 22] .
A large volume of XAI work is on producing more interpretable models while maintaining high-level performance (e.g. [10, 23] ), or on methods to automatically generate explanations. Given the complexity of current ML models, explanations are often pedagogical [34] , meaning that they reveal information about how the model works without faithfully representing the algorithms. Many methods rely on some kind of sensitivity analysis to illustrate how a feature contributes to the model prediction [26, 30] , so they can be model-agnostic, thus applicable to complex models. For example, LIME explains feature contribution by what happens to the prediction when the feature-values change (perturbing data) [30] . Another common category is case-based explanations, which use instances in the dataset to explain the behavior of ML models. Examples include using counter-examples [36] and similar prototypes from the training data [18] . Case-based explanations are considered easy to consume and efective in justifying the decision, but may be insuicient to explain how the model works.
Work on how people perceive explanations of ML systems is a growing area [4, 20, 25, 32] which aims to inform the choices and design of explanations for particular systems or tasks. Recent work calls for taxonomic organizations of explanations to enable design guidelines [25] . In earlier work on explaining expert systems, researchers argued the diference between description v.s. justiicationśby making not only the how visible to users, but also the why [33] . Accordingly, Wick and Thompson discussed the taxonomy of global-local explanations [37] . During initial practice, users may need global explanations that describe łhow the system works. ž During actual use, users tend to rely on justiications of why the system did what it did on particular cases.
Another useful taxonomy is proposed by Kulesza et al. by considering two dimensions of explanation idelity: soundness (how truthful each element in an explanation is with respect to the underlying system) and completeness (the extent to which an explanation describes all of the underlying system) [20] . They empirically showed that the best mental models arose from explanations with both high completeness and high soundness. However, crafting highly complete explanations comes with a tradeof, as completeness usually requires increasing the length and complexity of the explanation, which was shown to be detrimental to task performance and user experience in previous studies [28] .
While researchers have explored user preferences in explanation styles, they have paid little attention to individual diferences in such preferences. Meanwhile, psychological research has long been interested in individual diferences in explanatory reasoning. For example, research shows that some prefer simple, supericial explanations and others are more deliberative and relective in their reasoning [13, 19] . Such individual diferences can be predicted by cognitive style (e.g., cognitive relection, need for cognition) [13] and culture [19] . It is therefore possible that individuals difer in preferences for completeness and soundness of explanations.
Our work is concerned with how explanations impact fairness judgments of ML systems. We build on a recent study by Binns et al., which examined human perception of a classiier's fairness in the insurance domain [5] . They provided four diferent explanation types applied to ictional scenarios to elicit fairness judgment. While the study provided rich qualitative insights on the heuristics people use to make fairness judgments, the authors acknowledge a lack of ecological validity as the explanations were not drawn from real ML model output. Moreover, the explanations were not produced for the same data points, so they were incommensurate, which could possibly explain the absence of conclusive preference in their quantitative results.
Our work set out to overcome limitations on prior work by automatically generating four types of explanations on a real ML model, and quantitatively examining how they impact people's fairness judgments. Combining this advancement with the use of the data preprocessor allowed us to perform more carefully controlled experiments for ML fairness perception than prior work.
STUDY OVERVIEW
Related work informed four main considerations of our study: the use case, choices of explanation styles, fairness issues we focus on, and the individual diferences we explore. Through both quantitative and qualitative results, we aim to answer the following research questions:
RQ1 How do diferent styles of explanation impact fairness judgment of a ML system? RQ1a Are some explanations judged to be fairer?
RQ1b Are some explanations more efective in surfacing unfairness in the model? RQ1c Are some explanations more efective in surfacing fairness discrepancies in diferent cases?
RQ2 How do individual factors in cognitive style and prior position on algorithmic fairness impact the fairness judgment with regard to diferent explanations? RQ3 What are the beneits and drawbacks of diferent explanations in supporting fairness judgment of ML systems?
Use Case: COMPAS recidivism data
We conducted an empirical study with a ML model trained on a real data set. Similar to [14] , we chose a publicly available data set for predicting risk of recidivism (reofending) with known racial bias 1 . The data set was collected in Broward County, Florida over a two year span. It is used by COMPAS (Correctional Ofender Management Proiling for Alternative Sanctions), a commercial algorithm to help judges score criminal defendants' likelihood of reofending. However, ProPublica has reported on troubling issues with the COMPAS system [3, 21] . First, the classiier may have low overall accuracy ([3] reported 63.6%). Second, the model is reported to exhibit racial discrimination, with African American defendants' risk frequently overestimated.
We chose a criminal justice use case because it carries weight to elicit reaction on fairness, even for the general population. Note our goal is not to study the actual users of COMPAS. Rather, we are using the use case as a łprobež to empirically study fairness judgments. The same use case was used in previous studies to understand how people perceive algorithmic fairness with regard to features used [14] .
Explanation Styles
We chose to programmatically generate the four types of explanations introduced by Binns et al. [5] (details to be discussed in System Overview section) because they represent a set of common approaches in recent XAI work. They embody the categorization of global v.s. local explanations. Speciically, inluence and demographic-based explanations are global styles as they describe how the model works; sensitivity and case-based explanations are local styles as they attempt to justify the decision for a speciic case. These explanation styles vary along the taxonomy introduced by previous work in other ways: e.g. sensitivity based explanation is similar to a łwhat ifž [25] and the case-based explanation is the least łsoundž of the explanation types discussed [20] .
Fairness Issues
Given our use case, we consider fairness issues in terms of racial discrimination. While there are other controversial features in the dataset [14] , race is generally considered inappropriate to use in predicting criminal risk (termed protected variable). We focus on two types of fairness issues.
Model Unfairness.
As discussed, the COMPAS data set is known to be racially biased, but we mitigate that bias problem by using the data processing method in [9] . In the experiment, we introduce the use of the data processing technique as a betweensubject variable. By comparing participants' fairness judgment for a model trained on the raw data to that of processed data, we aim to understand whether participants could identify the model-wide fairness issue, and whether certain explanations expose the problem better.
3.3.2 Case-specific disparate impact. Predictions from an ML algorithm are not uniformly fairśconsider disparate impact from a protected variable. For example, if two individuals with identical proile features but diferent racial categories receive diferent predictions, it should be considered unfair [8, 14] . Statistically, these cases are on the decision boundary of the feature space given the relatively small weight of the race factor, meaning they have lowconidence predictions that may be unfair. In the experiment, we introduce disparate impact by race factor as a within-subject variable (i.e., each participant would be asked to judge some cases with disparate impact and some not). We adopt a factorial design with disparate impact and data processing. For subjects given models after data processing [9] , disparate impact is reduced. We aim to discover how well participants identify the case-speciic fairness issues using diferent explanations.
Our hypothesis is that given local explanations focus on justifying a particular case, they should more efectively surface fairness discrepancies between cases. In contrast, global explanations may require additional efort to reason about the position of the case with respect to the decision boundary (e.g., łThis person's features all have no impact in the model, except racež). Note that local explanations may expose the case-speciic fairness issue diferently. Case-based explanation exposes the boundary position with a low percentage of cases justifying the decision. Sensitivity-based explanation explicitly describes disparate impactśłChanging this person's race changes the predictionž.
Individual Diference factors
Based on prior work, we focus on two areas of individual factors: cognitive style and prior position on algorithmic fairness. For cognitive style, we measure individual's need for cognition [7] . For prior positions, we consider two levels: one's general position on the fairness of using ML systems for decision support, and one's position on the fairness of using a particular featureśhere we focus on the race factor.
SYSTEM OVERVIEW 4.1 Re-ofending Prediction Classiier
The model is a binary classiier predicting whether an individual in the COMPAS data set is likely to re-ofend or not, implemented by Scikit-learn's logistic regression. The use of a regression model is ecologically validÐmany current decision support systems use such simple and interpretable models [35] . However, the explanation styles we study are not limited to regression models. We built the model using a subset of features in the COMPAS dataset 2 , including Race as the feature with fairness issues. For simplicity, we focus on two racial groups (Caucasian and African-American), and iltered others. Other features included: Age (18-29/30-39/40-49/50-59/>59), Charge Degree (Felony/Misdemeanor), Number of Prior Convictions (0/1-3/4-6/7-10/>10), and Had Juvenile Convictions (True/False). According to Grgic-Hlaca et al. [14] , charge degrees and criminal history were deemed fair in a similar use case. Age is also important in assessing re-ofense risk. Following statistical convention, all categorical features are dummy coded using the median category as the reference level, where possible.
The accuracy of the model is 67.1% on raw data and 67.6% on processed data, comparable to reports on the accuracy of COM-PAS system [6, 21] . Note that logistic regression also produces a conidence level implicitly in class probabilities.
4.1.1 Data processing and cases with disparate impact. We used the method introduced in [9] to perform data processing then re-trained the model. The resulting model reduced bias against the African American group, as evidenced by the feature co-eicient being reduced from 0.177 to -0.036 (A feature co-eicient of 0 corresponds to the feature having no efect in the decision).
To identify cases with unfair treatment of disparate impact, we follow the deinition łtreating one person less favorably on a forbidden ground than another...in a comparable situationž [8] . That is, if perturbing a test example's protected variable (race) changes the algorithm's prediction, we consider it to have disparate impact. We found 23 cases in the raw datasetśall very near to the decision boundary 3 .
4.1.2
Sampling cases for the user study. Due to user study time constraints, we could only show each user a small sample of the explanations. Since we intended to study fairness discrepancies between disparately impacted and non-impacted cases, we oversampled the former category. Among the 23 disparately impacted instances, we sampled all 8 unique cases (i.e. the rest had the same feature-values as one of the 8 we sampled). From the non-impacted group of 992 instances, we sampled 16 unique cases.
Explanation Generation
As discussed, we patterned our explanations, shown in Figure 1 (truncated version, see supplementary materials for the full version), after the templates presented by Binns et al. [5] . While Binns et al. manually created examples of these explanation, we developed programs to automatically generate them to obtain comparable explanation versions for the same data point, controlling for diferences in representation and presentation. These generation methods can also be broadly applied to ML prediction models using relational features.
Input
Influence-based Explanation. describes the decision boundary itself. Because the feature coeicients of the logistic regression model encode the relative importance of each feature, we present them as strings of '+' and '-' in our explanations, as shown in Figure 1 . To do this, we discretized them into 11 buckets, based on the range of the maximum and minimum coeicient. This type of explanation is global in that the decision boundary is a property of the classiier, and thus will be described in the same way for all samples.
Input-Influence

Demographic
Case Sensitivity
The more +s/-s means a person with that attribute is more/less likely to re-offend. each feature category, the percentage with the same label as predicted for the presented example. This type of explanation is global and generates the same description for all samples on each side of the decision boundary.
4.2.3
Sensitivity-based Explanation. seeks to modify the presented sample along each feature until the prediction changes. When the prediction does change, we report back to the user the necessary feature change to produce the change in output. This type of explanation is local as it is speciic to each presented example, and justiies the decision by indicating changes needed to produce a diferent output.
4.2.4
Case-based Explanation. does a nearest neighbor search in the training data to ind similar cases. Since our study has a large data set with respect to the feature space, we frequently ind neighbors occupying the same feature space location as the sample presented for explanation. When this is the case, we show the % of those neighbors with the same label as the prediction. When no exact matches are found, we simply show the features and label for the nearest neighbor in the training data. This is a modiication to the design in Binns et al., which describes only a single identical or similar case. This explanation is local, and attempts to justify the decision by indicating similar examples with similar outputs.
METHODOLOGY
Our study adopted a mixed design by having data processing (raw/processed) and explanation styles (4 styles) as betweensubject variables, and disparate impact as a within-subject variable. Each participant completed 6 fairness judgment trials, where each trial consisted of judging a single case. 2 cases were randomly selected from the 8 disparately impacted cases, and we sampled 4 from the 16 non-impacted cases in the test data. The order of the trials was randomized.
In September 2018 we recruited 160 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, with the criteria that the worker must live in the US and have completed more than 1000 tasks with at least a 98% approval rate. They were randomly assigned to the 8 conditions (2 data processing treatments × 4 explanations). Among them, 62.5% are male, 78.8% are self-identiied as Caucasian, 29.4% are under 30, and 13.3% are above 50. In our quantitative analysis, we included participants' race and gender as co-variance but observed no signiicant efect.
Study Procedure
We conducted an online survey-style study. Participants irst provided informed consent, then reviewed a scenario about a ML system developed to assess defendants' re-ofense risk, to help a judge make bail decisions. Each participant was given 6 trials, and within each trial, the participant would irst review information about an individual (Figure 1 , center region), then make his or her own prediction about whether that individual would re-ofend. This step was to ensure they carefully consider the features used in the prediction. Subsequently, they would be presented with the prediction from the machine learning classiier with one of the four styles of explanations. They were asked to rate agreement with: łHow the software made the prediction was fairž based on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) Likert Scale, together with an open question justifying their rating.
We checked attention after the third trial, by asking participants to ind the feature not used by the software from a list of choices. All participants passed the check. After completing all tasks, participants would answer a survey measuring their individual diferences, and collecting demographic data. On average the study took 18 min to complete, and each participant was compensated with $3.
Individual Diferences
We measured two types of individual diferences: prior positions on algorithmic fairness, and cognitive style. For prior positions, we further diferentiate between one's general position on using ML systems to assist decision-making, and position on the fairness of using race as a feature. We use a semantic diferential scale that is often used to measure attitude on controversial topics [24] . Speciically, we ask participants to rate the statements łConsidering race as a factor in criminal risk predictionž and łUsing machine learning software to replace or augment human decision makingž, 
RESULTS: QUANTITATIVE
We start with examining the efect of explanation style, data processing (raw/processed) and disparate impact (true/false) on participants' fairness judgment (RQ1). We then explore how individual diferences, including prior position on fairness of ML, prior position on fairness of using the race feature, and need for cognition, make a diference on the judgment (RQ2). All statistical analyses were done in R. The lmerTest package was used to run mixed-model regressions.
Explanation, data processing, and disparate impact
Given the complexity of the statistical model, we irst describe the trends with the descriptive data, then report statistical testing results. In Figure 2 , we plot the mean and the 95% conidence interval of the mean of fairness ratings in all experiment treatments, showing several trends:
(1) Predictions made on the processed data (triangles) were rated fairer than those on the raw data (circles). It suggests that participants perceived fairness issues for the model trained on the raw data, and the processing technique mitigated the problem. (2) Predictions made on cases with disparate impact (blue dashed lines) were rated less fair than those without it (red solid lines). This shows participants' fairness perceptions align with the presence of a fairness discrepancy between groups. (3) Explanation styles made nuanced diferences. As expected, the two local explanations led to higher discrepancy of fairness ratings between disparately impacted cases and non-impacted cases (diference between the dashed and solid lines) than the two global explanations. Thus, the former are more efective in exposing case-speciic fairness issues. Moreover, this diference is most prominent for sensitivity-based explanations applied to raw data. This could be caused by sensitivity-based explanation being the most explicit in exposing disparate impact, while data processing mitigated the problem.
We now report the statistical signiicance of these observed trends. In particular, to validate that sensitivity-based explanation is most efective in exposing the disparate impact issue in the raw data, we expect to see a three-way interaction between explanation style, data processing, and disparate impact. We construct a mixed-efect regression model with the three-way interaction (and all the lower order interactions) as ixed efects, and participant as a random efect. We control for gender and race as covariances and neither has signiicant efect. The three-way interaction we expected is not signiicant, F (3, 152) = 0.54, p = 0.66. There is a marginally signiicant 4 two-way interaction between explanation style and disparate impact, F (3, 152) = 2.35, p = 0.07, and signiicant main efect of disparate impact, F (1, 152) = 103.25, p < 0.001, and data processing, F (1, 152) = 4.65, p = 0.03.
The main efect of data processing and disparate impact prove statistical signiicance for the irst two observed trends. The twoway interaction indicates that explanation styles had diferential impact on exposing the disparate impact issue. We conduct pairwise comparison for this interactive efect to identify between which explanation styles this perceived fairness discrepancy signiicantly difer. We found that if we use sensitivity-based explanation as the reference level, inluence-based explanation is signiicantly diferent, F (1, 156) = 5.14, p = 0.02, and demographic-based explanation is marginally signiicant, F (1, 156) = 3.29, p = 0.07; If we use casebased explanation as the reference, inluence-based explanation is marginally diferent, F (1, 156) = 3.36, p = 0.07. These results validate the observation that local explanations are more efective than global ones in exposing fairness discrepancies in diferent cases.
While we did not ind statistical signiicance of the three-way interaction that validates the efectiveness of sensitivity-based explanation, a possibility is that there are individual diferences for which the model did not account. In the next section, we explore that possibility. Figure 2 , split by prior position on the fairness of using the race feature. Left: Participants that consider using race łUnfairž (race_pos < 4). Right: Participants that consider using race łFairž or neutral (race_pos >= 4).
Individual diferences
We enter the following factors into the model: prior position on using machine learning to assist decision-making (ML position), prior position on fairness of using the race feature (race position), and need for cognition. We start from four level interactions of each of the individual diference factors with the three manipulated variables (explanation, data processing, disparate impact), and then iteratively reduce it to lower-level interactions if it is not signiicant. We eventually arrive in a model with the following terms: a four way interaction between race position and the three manipulated factors, F (3, 144) = 2.59, p = 0.05, and a marginally signiicant two-way interaction between ML position and explanation style, F (3, 137) = 2.43, p = 0.07. We did not ind need for cognition to make a diference and removed it. By including these individual diference factors in the model, we now ind the three-way interaction between explanation style, data processing, and disparate impact to be signiicant, F (3, 144) = 2.96, p = 0.03 (its lower-level two-way interactions as well). In addition to the main efect of data processing (F (1, 137) = 4.68, p = 0.03) and disparate impact (F (1, 144) = 28.86, p < 0.001) as in the original model, we also ind a main efect of ML position (F (1, 137) = 17.31, p < 0.001), race position (F (1, 137) = 6.43, p = 0.01), and a marginally signiicant main efect of explanation style, F (3, 137) = 2.11, p = 0.10.
The above signiicant three-way and four-way terms, after including race position in the analysis, demonstrate that the consideration of this individual factor łde-noisedž the data. In other words, it is only when an individual considers using race to be unfair, that a sensitivity-based explanation like thisśłIf Nolan had been 'Caucasian', he would have been predicted to be NOT likely to re-ofendžśheightens the concern and signiicantly lowers the perceived fairness. When an individual does not consider it problematic to use race as a decision factor, they would not perceive such an explanation negatively. This trend is illustrated in Figure 3 , where we separate participants who considered the race factor unfair and those who considered it fair-to-neutral (33.1% of all participants). In fact, for those who consider race to be a fair or neutral feature to use (Figure 3, Right) , they did not perceive predictions made on the raw data (circles) to be less fair than processed data (triangles), and generally rated fairness to be higher (thus the main efect of prior position on race).
The main efect of ML position and its interactive efect with explanation style indicates that a general positive position on algorithmic fairness enhanced perceived fairness, and also led to diferent explanation preferences. We conducted pairwise comparison between styles of explanation, and found this interactive efect with ML position to be signiicant for inluence-based explanation, F (1, 148) = 6.25, p = 0.01, and marginally signiicant for demographic-based explanation, F (1, 148) = 2.77, p = 0.10, if using case-based explanation as the reference. It is signiicant for inluence-based explanation, F (1, 148) = 3.73, p = 0.05, if using case-based explanation as the reference. This implies that people who trust ML systems gain even higher conidence in the fairness of a prediction given global explanation (Figure 4 ). It is worth noting that after controlling for these individual factors, we now see a marginally signiicant main efect of explanation style. Pairwise comparisons show that case-based explanation was rated marginally signiicantly less fair than inluence-based (F (1, 153) = 3.51, p = 0.06) and demographic-based explanation (F (1, 148) = 3.20, p = 0.08). We consider it as evidence that casebased explanation is seen as generally less fair.
To summarize, in response to RQ1 and RQ2, we found evidence that: 1) Case-based explanation is seen as generally less fair; Global explanations further enhance perceived fairness for those who have general trust for machine learning systems to make fair decisions.
2) Local explanations are more efective than global explanations at exposing case-speciic fairness issues, or fairness discrepancies between diferent cases. Sensitivity-based explanations are the most efective in exposing the fairness issue of disparate impact made by a particular featureÐbut only if the individual views using that feature as unfair. 3) In general, we show that individuals' prior position on ML trust and feature fairness have signiicant impact on how they react to explanations, and possibly more so than diferences in cognitive styles.
RESULTS: QUALITATIVE
Along with collecting fairness ratings, we asked participants to justify their judgment. The authors reviewed this data and used open coding to extract themes in the answers. Here we discuss two groups of themes. One is to understand how participants made fairness judgments. Another is on participants' feedback for the four styles of explanations.
How is fairness judgment made?
In the open-ended answers, we investigated the criteria participants used to judge fairness. We see variations in reliance on the provided explanations, and depth of reasoning about the algorithm's processes. These results provide further evidence of individual differences in the criteria used to make fairness judgments of ML systems.
7.1.1 General trust or distrust in ML systems. Some participants provided reasons not speciic to a case or explanation, but that a general trust or distrust of ML systems dominated their judgment, as they tended to give consistent ratings across cases. Reasons for a general trust include łbased on objective data is better than subjective opinionsž (CR-31) 5 , łlarge data setž (CR-37), łuses statistics based on prior knowledge to make a judgmentž (IR-176). In contrast, some participants considered generalization by statistics is unfair to begin withśłit might be unfair to group everybody together -makes more sense for the judge to have individual judgment.ž (IP-184), while others think that łthere needs to be a human element to the decisionž (CR-62). These observations corroborate Binns et al. [5] and further validate that participants varied on their general position on using ML system for criminal justice, and it inluenced their fairness judgment.
Features used.
Participants frequently cited features used by the algorithm as reasons for fairness or unfairness. Some explicitly diferentiated between the process of the algorithm and the feature consideredśłThe software makes it's decisions based on it's algorithm, so I believe it is fair and impartial on that account. However, some of the categories it is programmed to consider, such as age and race, are unfairž (SP-71). It is interesting to note that we observe individual diferences in the position on the fairness of race feature in the qualitative results as well. While many participants called out the problem of considering race, a few participants who saw the processed data commented that ł[if] race was not a predictor [it] may not accurately relect the realityž (DP-68). There is also some controversy on using age and juvenile priors as features. Participants' comments echo results from a previous study [14] showing that people consider multiple dimensions (e.g., relevance, disparate outcome, volitionality) in their judgments about the fairness of features used in decision-making algorithms, and individuals weigh these dimensions diferently. 7.1.3 Lacking features. As observed in [5] , several participants criticized the limited features used in our simple model. Some suggested to have more detailed information on current features, such as łfrequency of priors or the interval of time since the last prior in order to get a more accurate assessment of what one's prior record meansž (DP-53). Others are less optimistic about the possible suficiency of features to ensure fairnessśłsoftware cannot fully take into account environmental factors that cause people to go down a bad pathž (CR-76).
Prediction process.
Many participants based their fairness judgment on their understanding of the algorithms' process. Some, especially those presented with global explanations, closely examined explanation details, e.g. łSoftware seems to be lawed in major areas... improper weighing of distant vs recent past, and a questionable choice of how to evaluate probabilities in each casež (DR-119). Some also considered failure to account for external factors, e.g. 5 Participant IDs give treatment info, explanation (Sensitivity, Case, Input-Inluence, Demographic) followed by data processing (Raw, Processed). łthe number may be relatively accurate for the race and charge degree categories, but if the [past] laws were diferent they would probably be higherž (DR-107). Moreover, multiple participants attributed their low fairness ratings to insuicient understanding of process, or ł'how' the data is usedž (DR-172). 7.1.5 Data issue. A few participants questioned the underlying data used. Almost all of them were in either the demographic-or case-based explanation conditions, as these two styles leverage information about distributions of similar cases to explain the decision. For example, ł'Not re-ofend' rate for African Americans is a little low. I think the percentage may be higher in reality... data could have been biasedž (DR-107).
Explanation styles
Below we summarize codes that are prominent for each explanation style. These results could help us better understand the beneits and drawbacks of each explanation style, and inform future work on designs of ML explanations.
Influence based.
It is a global explanation that faithfully describes how each feature contributes to the algorithm's decisionmaking process. We observed that this explanation prompted more comments on details of the process, such as the weights of diferent features, and the trends with regard to diferent categories of a feature, e.g. łit is fair because it doesn't discriminate by race, but rather on age and prior convictions... if someone exhibits a behavior pattern it is likely to will continue, and I think people who are young are more apt to take risksž (IP-208). On the one hand, the detailed description of the algorithm process adds to the conidence in participants' fairness judgments, which may help explain its enhancement of fairness perception among those trusting ML algorithms. On the other hand, it exposes more information for people to scrutinize, and thus subject to critiques from the heterogeneous standards of fairness.
Demographic based.
This is a type of global explanation that does not expose the process of the algorithm, but justiies the decision with the data distributions. Sometimes, the distributions were seen as convincing, e.g. łThe high percentage of people with more than 10 prior convictions who end up reofending was staggering, and justiies the predictionž (DP-57). Other times, participants found its explanation of the process inadequate, as the percentages do not clearly connect to an outcomeśłThe percentages aren't high enough. It could go either wayž (DR-157). Sometimes it also directed participants attention to the potential biases of underlying data.
Sensitivity based.
The main beneit of sensitivity-based explanation seems to be its conciseness and explicitly directing attention to features relevant to the particular decision. It appears to be convincing and easy to process when a decision is uncontroversial śłThe rationale is so basic (no prior ofenses) that it has to be fairž (SR-138). łIt's taking into consideration everything that we would and puts it into an easy to read mannerž (SP-220). Consistent with our quantitative results, for disparately impacted cases where the race factor is explicitly mentioned, sensitivity-based explanation heightens the concern and was perceived most negativelyśłIt says that in the same situation, if the ofender were African-American rather than Caucasian, they would have been likely to ofend. This is racial proiling and inaccurate in my opinion.ž (SR-124).
Case based.
As we found in the quantitative results, casebased explanation was judged to be the least fairÐand the qualitative results provided reasons. First, some found it to provide little information about how the algorithm arrives at a conclusion. Second, the number of identical cases and the percentage of cases supporting the decision are often considered too small to justify the decisionśłIt was unfair for the defendant because she was compared to only 22 other identical individuals... not to mention that only a little over 50% reofended.ž (CR-61). This observation is consistent with Binns et al. [5] , however, our work is based on the actual output of a ML model trained on a real dataset ś allowing us to empirically show a limitation of case-based explanation 6 . Lastly, we found variations in individuals' positions on the fairness of the łexplained processž (as opposed to the actual algorithm process) to make decisions based on identical cases. While some people consider it to be fair to łcompare the actions of people with similar history and backgroundsž (CP-200), others questioned the underlying rationale such as łis anyone really identical if more things consideredž (CP-201).
DISCUSSION 8.1 Supporting diferent needs of fairness judgment
The most important take-away from our study is that there are multiple aspects and heterogeneous standards in making fairness judgments, beyond evaluating features, as studied in previous work [14] . Our experiment highlights two types of fairness issues: unfair models (e.g., learned from biased data), and fairness discrepancy of diferent cases (e.g., in diferent regions of the feature space). Our qualitative results further illustrate that algorithmic fairness is evaluated by various dimensions including data, features, process, statistical validity, as well as broader ethical and societal concerns. Our results highlight the need to provide diferent styles of explanation tailored for exposing diferent fairness issues. For example, we show that local explanations are more efective in exposing fairness discrepancies between diferent cases, while global explanations seem to render more conidence in understanding the model and generally enhance the fairness perception. Hybridizing the two techniques reveals a possible human-in-the-loop worklow; using global explanations to understand and evaluate the model, and local explanations to scrutinize individual cases.
It is critical to note that diferent regions of the feature space may have varied levels of fairness and diferent types of fairness issues. This calls for development of ine-grained sampling methods and explanation designs to better support fairness judgment of ML systems. To that end, we envision an active-learning paradigm for fairness improvement, where the system interactively queries the human for fairness judgment of its predictions, together with explanation options, then optimizes the algorithm based on user feedback. 6 We found that 16% of the test data exhibited the failure mode of contradicting the claim (< 50% of individuals with identical features share label). Meanwhile insuicient justiication of the claim (between 45% and 55% label matches) was quite common, with 24% of the test data. The prevalence of these failure modes indicates inherent łunsoundness. ž Our qualitative results suggest another useful categorization of explanation styles: process oriented v.s. data oriented explanation. The case-and demographic-based explanations we studied leverage information on data distribution to justify its decision but reveal less on how the decision was made. Inluence-and sensitivity-based explanations link each feature to the decision. We observe a general preference for process-oriented (how) explanations, although a focus on data has the potential beneit of directing attention to issues in the data and dilutes the łblamež on the algorithms.
Individual diferences and descriptive fairness
Another contribution of our study is to empirically demonstrate how individuals' prior positions on algorithmic fairness impact their reaction to diferent explanations. We diferentiate between a general position on algorithmic fairness, and position on fairness of a particular feature used. The diference between normative (prescriptively deining what is fair) versus descriptive fairness and its implication for algorithmic fairness has been discussed in previous work [14] . Empirically, we show that even though race is considered a protected variable, individual positions on its fairness still vary (close to one third of participants considered it neutral or fair to use). This indicates a lack of agreement on the meaning of moral concepts, a result Binns et al. [5] hinted at qualitatively. In diferent contexts, an algorithm developer may have to choose between a normative or a descriptive position of fairness, and it is important to be aware of the variation of fairness position in the population. For example, if a ML system takes a normative position and aims to eliminate predeined biases based on people's feedback, it may need to account for their prior positions to weigh the feedback diferently. It may be arguable whether explanation should always attempt soundness and completeness for all individuals. On the other hand, if a system aims to provide optimal decision support for individual needs, it would be useful to provide mechanisms for individuals to express their prior positions as direct input for the algorithm (similar to the idea of active-learning by tuning features [29, 31] ).
Limitations
We performed our study with crowdworkers, rather than judges who would be the actual users of this type of tool. Additionally, there are many styles and elements of explanations not studied here. One important element not studied is conidence, which we declined to present to participants because we could not control for it.
CONCLUSION
Our work provides empirical insights on how diferent styles of explanation impact people's fairness judgment of ML systems, particularly the diferences between a global explanation describing the model and a local explanation justifying a particular decision. We highlight that there is no one-size-its-all solution for efective explanation, but depends on the kinds of fairness issues and user proiles. Providing hybrid explanations, allowing both overview of the model and scrutiny of individual cases, may be necessary for accurate fairness judgment. Furthermore, we show that individuals' prior positions on algorithmic fairness inluence how they react to diferent explanation types. The results call for a personalized approach to explaining ML systems. However, speciic to fairness, ML systems may need to take a normative or descriptive position in diferent contexts, which may diferentially require corrective or adaptive actions considering individual diferences in their fairness positions.
